The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Moderated by Francesca Giovannini, Ph.D., Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
David M. Allison, Ph.D., Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom
Sarah Bidgood, Director, Eurasia Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey; Ph.D. Candidate, King’s College London
Hyun-Binn Cho, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, The College of New Jersey
Stephen Herzog, Ph.D., Senior Researcher in Nuclear Arms Control, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich; Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Ariel F. W. Petrovics, Ph.D., Assistant Research Professor, Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland